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UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEEP OCEAN: 
FROM DATA TO NORMS 
ZDENEK J. SLOUKA * 
INTRODUCTION 
Marine affairs, as a set of active relationships between man and the 
sea, are today a rapidly expanding universe. Already a major concern of 
policy-makers in many states, marine affairs display a characteristic of 
all public issues in a state of flux: the man of action is pulling ahead of 
the man of thought-often in the same person-and the question of how 
well we know what we are doing is harder and harder to ignore. This 
question is particularly critical in international marine affairs. The 
international system is far behind the national ones in its lack of 
effective mechanisms for regulating scientific and technological change 
and bringing social sciences to bear on the policy and law making 
processes. 
Two types of activity make up the primary international response to 
the implications of scientific and technological change pervading 
marine affairs. One is a visible and vigorous flow of moves: states, 
organizations and individuals are drafting many blueprints for new 
institutions and rules to govern the uses of the world ocean. The 
blueprints come in many shades between national egoism and global 
messianism, and in time-projections ranging from the immediate to a 
distant future. All these, when thrown into the melting pot of 
multilateral negotiations of the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the 
1973 Geneva Conference, are expected to yield at least some residual 
consensus on an international policy for regulating man's use of the 
oceans. 
The second type of response to the technological challenge and its 
implications consists of attempts to assess whether international 
institutions as we now know them can effectively cope with the 
demands and opportunities opening up in marine affairs. This is 
primarily an evaluative, largely academic quest: what courses of 
actions are open to the international community, so goes the question, if 
it is to manage its own propensity to increasingly use and abuse the 
marine environment? 
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This process of assessment, scholarly and deliberate, is much les8 
energetic than the blueprinting rush of the social engineers, and 
remains rather removed from the mainstream of decision making. 
International negotiations are either here or imminent. Only the effort 
to assess and understand what it is we are attempting to do, and what 
we are actually capable of doing, is asthmatic. In a very real sense, the 
international community acts faster than it thinks. Perhaps, it cannot 
do otherwise. 
This gap results partly from the diverse roles which are played by 
men competent to diagnose the problems and potential of international 
policy-making in areas of scientific and technological change. Basic 
research, policy-oriented inquiries, and the formulations of preferred 
policies represent a set of roles social scientists play. In fields such as 
marine or environmental affairs, the brain-drain into the last cate-
gory-prestigious, exciting and even lucrative-is quite noticeable, 
especially in the United States. Yet this may be but a symptom 
of a more fundamental factor at work. The main reason why social 
and political action often runs ahead of social and political assess-
ment is probably buried deep inhuman nature and in the nature of con-
temporary society. In any case, the policy-making process cannot be 
halted to await new doses of wisdom. The only alternatives are to 
lament the state of affairs or, while lamenting it, to increase and im-
prove the flow of social science insights into the policy-making en-
deavors. 
'fhe pages below offer an analytical survey of the initial phase of the 
seabed issue as it unfolded in the United Nations in the late 1960's. The 
study has a limited goal, to identify some of the elements which 
characterized that phase and to assess their role and impact. The 
scientific and technological factor pervades most areas of oceanic 
policy-making and, therefore, serves as a particular focus of this study. 
The possibility exists that some of the scientific and technological 
factors influencing the formulation of an international seabed policy 
represent a more widespread and growing challenge to the 
contemporary law-making mechanisms in other fields as well. While 
this possibility of useful analogies is noted, they are not critically 
examined. 
THE CHANGING ARENA OF OCEAN p OLICY 
Escalation is a dominant feature of the process through which states 
seek to change the rules of the ocean. The international community set 
out to formulate principles and norms for governing the uses of the deep 
ocean floor; now it finds itself about ready to scrutinize the entire law of 
the sea through a global conference. But the 1973 Law of the Sea 
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Conference, if indeed it should take place, will be an affair very 
different from its 1958 Geneva version. Many factors influencing the 
process through which the international community formulated the 
rules of conduct in the marine environment have changed significantly. 
There are now many nations with well-developed interests in ocean 
uses. Many new ocean uses have been recognized and many technologies 
have been developed to utilize the hydrosphere more effectively. In 
1958 the political interest in the formulation and reformulation of legal 
rules stopped at the continental shelf's outer edge; now it engulfs the 
entire ocean floor. These quantitative differences between the fifties 
and the seventies are massive and their impact on the law-making 
process is going to be profound. However, there are also qualitative 
differences in the contemporary setting of oceanic politics. Although 
many of these differences are quite visible, they are not easily 
accounted for and fitted into a meaningful pattern. 
Some of the qualitative differences are likely to make the 1958 
Geneva law-making experience inadequate as a lesson for 1973. One 
may well begin with a somewhat general impression: the politics of 
oceanic law-making is much more intense in the seventies that it was in 
the fifties. Perhaps this simply reflects the fact that to many people the 
ocean of the seventies seems richer and more important than that of the 
fifties. Alternatively, the world of the seventies, less immediately 
concerned with global issues of war and peace, has more energy to 
spend on the race for food, minerals and other values of the sea. 
However, the step-up in the political intensity of the law-making 
process may have still other and deeper roots. Among them is a broad 
lesson learned since the fifties by many smaller states, reflecting their 
progressing adaptation to the contemporary conditions of international 
relations. The lesson is this: that in issues such as those presented in 
oceanic policy-making-jurisdictional limits, fishing rights, or research 
restrictions-the great powers may be effectively defied, because the 
sanctions they can apply to enforce compliance are limited and 
diminishing. A related reason for the quickening of the political pulse of 
oceanic law-making may be the fuller realization by many countries 
that those in international councils who show no interest and say 
nothing get nothing. Even if they are uninvolved and more or less 
uninterested in marine affairs today, many countries feel that they 
should nevertheless negotiate for the sake of their potential future 
interests, or to seek the satisfactions of other needs, unrelated to the 
sea. 
Still another element of change in ocean policy-making is the greater 
diversity of international as well as subnational participants seeking to 
sway the ocean policy in the direction of their particular interests. 
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Among the active international participants with varying measures of 
direct influence on the ocean policy-making process are various non-
governmental and semi-governmental organizations, scientific and 
other, as well as intergovernmental agencies often with well-developed 
interests and policies of their own. Simultaneously, the expanding 
range of actual or potential ocean uses makes national policy-making 
more complex. New interests are articulated and seek to be served; even 
smaller and less developed states for whom the ocean used to represent 
but one particular value, mostly fish, now find it necessary to weigh and 
range their Jllarine priorities for today, tomorrow, and the future. The 
result is often an increased difficulty and procrastination in the shaping 
of a national ocean policy and, consequently, a greater instability of 
positions already taken by a country in international negotiations. This 
need not be altogether bad; a measure of flexibility in a national policy 
stand is potentially an asset. However, instability and flexibility are 
two different things; where flexibility energizes negotiation, 
uncertainty stifles it. But whatever its effect, the qualitative change 
since 1958, resulting from tht proliferation of interacting interests, is 
again very real. 
A closer view of many of the new elements emerging on the law-
making horizon of the seventies comes through an analysis of the 
policy-making overture acted out in the second half of the last decade in 
the United Nations. 
THE SEABED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: THE 1966-69 OVERTURE 
In the United Nations the year 1969 was a threshhold year in the 
development of an international policy for the deep ocean floor. The 
seabed policy-making in 1969 shows a sharp discontinuity from the 
previous three years and opens up a new phase of the policy-making 
process. This discontinuity and the main factors contributing to it 
become quite clear as one reviews the changing spectrum of policy 
issues expressed in the General Assembly resolutions and surveys the 
shifting configuration of political interests around these issues. The 
changing content and the fate of the various seabed resolutions acted on 
by the General Assembly, abbreviated into a table, illustrate a dynamic 
political process. 
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U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY SEABED RESOLUTIONS 1966-70 
Date Resolution 
1966 2172 (XXI) Secretary-General to undertake 
comprehensive survey of marine 
science and technology 
1967 2340 (XXII) Ad Hoc Seabed Committee created 
1968 2467 (XXIll) A Seabed Committee continued and 
enlarged 
B Study dangers of pollution 
C Study feasibility of inter-
national control 
D Encourage scientific research 
and data dissemination 
1969 2574 (XXIV) A Communicate with all states 
to ascertain desirability of 
law-of-the-sea conference 
1970 2749 (XXV) 
2750 (XXV) 
B Prepare draft declaration of 
principles go-verning uses of 
seabed 
C Continue study of types of 
international control 
D Moratorium: freeze exploita-
tion and claims 
Declaration of principles 
A Study economic impact of 
seabed exploitation 
B Study problems of access bv 
landlocked countries to seabed 
C Call and prepare 1973 compre-
hensive law-of-the-sea con-
ference 
1966-The Issue Emerges 
Vote 
100-0-11 
unanimous 
111-0-7 
unanimous 
85-9-:25 
unanimous 
65-12-30 
109-0-1 
100-0-11 
62-28-26 
108-0-14 
104-0-16 
111-0-11 
108-7-fi 
In 1966 the seabed problem was not yet a major policy item on the 
General Assembly agenda. However, this was a crucial year. In 1966 the 
stage was set for a rapid politicization of the deep ocean floor issue. It 
opened a new phase rather than a mere continuation and development of 
ideas on the internationalization of the seabed which had been advanced 
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before and during the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. 1 
In the fifties, the ideas about internationalizing the deep ocean floor 
were primarily legalistic notions put forward in the context and as a by-
product of a reformulation of the law of the sea. In 1966, the seabed 
issue entered the political arena in the context of the development 
program. Requests that the Secretary-General prepare studies dealing 
with the marine resources beyond the continental shelf were, in fact, an 
outgrowth of the Secretary-General's proposal for a five-year survey 
program on the development of non-agricultural natural resources. 2 
This proposal itself was motivated by "the sense of frustration and even 
disappointment that had been evident in the General Assembly and in 
the Economic and Social Council when they had come to weigh up 
achievements and failures of the United Nations Development 
Decade." 3 
In 1966 two draft resolutions were submitted, one in the Economic 
and Social Council,4 another somewhat later in the General Assembly. 5 
1. The establishment of an international board for the protection of the resources of the 
sea was proposed in the United Nations International Law Commission by Jean 
Spiropoulos as early as 1951. 1 U.N. -YRBK OF THE INT'L LAW CoMM'N 304, (1951). In 1955 
Georges Scelle suggested that an international administrative authority be created within 
the United Nations framework and empowered to control the uses of the resources of the 
bed and subsoil of the high seas. 1 U.N. YRBK OF THE INT'L LAW CoMM'N 10 (1955). During 
the 1958 Geneva Conference of the Law of the Sea the Federal Republic of Germany 
proposed the establishment of international control over the entire ocean floor; the 
proposal found some support in the policies of Japan and Monaco. U.N. Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, 6 Official Records 7-8, 14, 18, 125-126. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13142. See also, 
z. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: A STUDY IN THE DYNAMICS 
OF CusTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37-38 (1968); and U.N. Secretariat, Legal As-
pects of the Question of the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-
Bed and the Ocean Floor ... , a study prepared for the Ad Hoc Committee to Study the 
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Juris-
diction, 2nd session, U.N. Doc. Al AC. 135/19/ Add. 2at13-17 (June 25, 1968). 
2. The Secretary-General's proposal was submitted in a biennial review of the work of 
the United Nations in the field of non-agricultural resources (U.N. Doc. E/4132). The 
proposal was meant to be "a major and practical contribution in this field to the second 
half of the United Nations Development Decade" <U.N. Doc. A/6460). 
3. As described by Mr. De Seynes, U.N. Under Secretary for Economic and Social 
Affairs during the 1408th meeting of ECOSOC, 40th session . 
4. The draft resolution (U.N. Doc. El AC. 6/L. 330) was sponsored jointly by Ecuador, 
Pakistan, and the United States, and was adopted by ECOSOC without change as 
ECOSOC Res. 1112 (XL)(March 7, 1966). 
5. The General Assembly text, later to become G.A. Res. 2172 (XXI) (December 6, 
1966), asked the Secretary-General" .. . to undertake, in addition to the survey requested 
by the Economic and Social Council, a comprehensive survey of activities in marine 
science and technology, including that relating to mineral resources development ... " 
and, for that purpose, to set up "a small group of experts to be selected, as far as possible, 
from the specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations ... " 
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The debate on the General Assembly draft resolution was extensive and 
abrasive enough to reflect some of the main lines of an emerging policy 
conflict. The basic issues were whether new studies on the marine 
resources beyond the continental shelf should be requested through the 
Secretary-General and whether the international community should 
rely on bodies such as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic 
Commission to supply the necessary information. The request that the 
Secretary-General create his own expert council for the study was a 
particular target of criticism. 
The debate was not inspired solely by budgetary concerns of the 
intervening delegations. Political interests came through quite visibly. 
For example, the United States delegation defended the draft 
throughout the debate in the Second Committee. In this action, 
however, the United States spokesmen seem to have followed their own 
preferences for an internationally oriented course with a marked degree 
of initiative and independence from the Department of State.6 In time, 
evidence may become available to form a judgment whether, in fact, 
this was a case in which diplomats, enjoying considerable freedom of 
decision-making in a policy area of relatively low priority, actually 
made political steps of far-reaching consequences. In any case, the 
United States' diplomacy itself pushed the seabed issue into new 
political visibility and thereby catalyzed interests which eventually 
carried it onto the floor of the General Assembly. 
The Soviet Union exerted considerable energy to get the issue away 
from the politically volatile atmosphere of the General Assembly by 
redelegating it into the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 
(hereinafter the IOC). 7 While the Soviet delegate argued that 
unnecessary duplication should be avoided, it was Sir Edward Warner, 
speaking for the United Kingdom, who spelled out the real 
apprehension, namely, that" ... a vast new and continuing activity in 
the United Nations might be opened up without adequate consideration 
6. At this moment this can only be inferred from various signs. The strongest is the 
obvious discomfort shown by the U.S. policy makers, and the policy disarray, when the 
sea-bed issue was brought before the First Committee of the General Assembly and the 
move set in motion the congressional mechanism and the higher levels in the Department 
of State. But some reading of the internal policy-making strain can be also obtained from 
the fact that the marine affairs studies requested of the Secretary-General had to be 
supported by substantial funds obtained through non-official U.S. sources. For a 
statement by U.S. representative, Mr. Roosevelt, regarding the substantial contributions 
made by U.S. non-official organizations, see General Assembly, 21st Session, Official 
Records, Second Committee, 1062nd meeting (8 November 1966), par. 5. Mr. De Seynes, 
U.N. Under Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs, stated that thanks for obtaining 
such contributions were due to "trade union leader Walter Reuther." Id. 1063rd meeting, 
par. 52. 
7. Id. 1062nd and 1063rd meetings. 
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of the financial and other implications .... " 8 In retrospect it is, of 
course, quite striking to note that during the same debate and only a 
few months before Malta proposed the seabed item for the General 
Assembly agenda, Ambassador Pardo argued against the United States 
proposal which would involve the Secretary-General and the General 
Assembly in the seabed issue. A survey of the state of knowledge of the 
resources of the sea, he cautioned, may be too costly in relation to the 
benefits it could bring. 9 
1967-The Mobilization of Interest 
The adoption of the resolutions requesting new studies of the 
resources of the deep ocean floor and the whole political process 
surrounding the resolutions were important ingredients in what 
became a rapid mobilization of interests in an issue which until then, at 
least from the perspective of the General Assembly, was politically so 
marginal as to be almost non-existent. In view of the initial Maltese 
policy in 1966 with its tendency to see the problem of the deep ocean 
floor as primarily a scientific concern best left to IOC, Ambassador 
Pardo's submission in 1967 of the new item for the agenda of the 
General Assembly was itself an effect of the mobilization rather than 
its beginning. Its novelty was primarily in its political thrust and in the 
forcefulness and imagination with which the issue was laid out. 10 This 
was a classical example of a small country presenting a big issue 
effectively in order to achieve prominence, influence and other values. 11 
8. Id. 1063rd meeting, par. 2 (emphasis added) . 
9. Id. 1062nd meeting, par. 33. 
10. The Maltese submission of the item came in the form of a note verbale of August 
18, 1967 requesting the Secretary-General to have the issue of the deep ocean floor in-
cluded as a supplementary item in the agenda of the 22nd session of the General 
Assembly. In the note verbale the issue was outlined but briefly. The full and formal 
presentation lasting several hours was made on November 1, 1967 on the floor of the 
First Committee, complete with scientific and technical data so selected and arranged as 
to create an image of oceanic wealth within the reach of the international community. 
For the text of the note verbale, see General Assembly, 22nd Session, Official Records 
(Annexes: Agenda Item 92), U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967). For Arvid Pardo's presentation, 
see U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/P/V. 1515 and 1516 (November 1, 1967), or HousE COMM., on 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INTERIM REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEEP OCEAN 
RESOURCES, H.R. Rep. No. 999, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 267-286 (1967). For a fuller 
analysis of the Maltese presentation, see z. SLOUKA, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND 
INTERNATIONAL Poucv: THE CASE OF THE SEABED (forthcoming). 
11. The question of the relative freedom representatives of small countries enjoy in the 
United Nations is of more than little interest. The contrast between the complex national 
restraints on major policy initiatives by representatives of countries such as the United 
States or the Soviet Union and the elbow room allowed to diplomats such as Ambassador 
Pardo, is considerable. In an informative newspaper profile of Arvid Pardo, Kathleen 
Teltsch of .The New York Times notes the agility with which the Maltese Ambassador 
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In 1967, the seabed issue escalated in the sense that it moved from 
relative obscurity in the Economic and Financial (Second) Committee 
into the more influential Political (First) Committee. 12 However, the 
crucial point of international policy remained essentially unchanged. 
The core question still was whether or not the issue of allocating rights 
to the resources of the deep ocean floor was ripe and should have been 
before the General Assembly at all. 
In retrospect, the question really no longer existed. The Soviet Union 
futilely adopted a policy consistent with its 1966 stand when it asked 
that the whole matter be postponed for a few years while scientists 
looked more systematically into the properties of the deep ocean floor. 1:i 
The United States became much more cautious and restrained; the 
effort of its spokesmen to play the issue down was very obvious. 14 The 
searched for new subjects and then initiated and prosecuted new policies in the General 
Assembly; after the sea-bed he followed with a less spectacular success with international 
controls over radiological weapons and then with military implications of laser 
technology. Ambassador Pardo was quoted in the article: "We operate independently. We 
do not ask other countries to join Malta in sponsoring our proposals. We want them 
judged on merit. We base our proposals on study, on reading, on learning." N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 10, 1969, at 5. 
12. When the original Maltese note verbale was submitted in August 1967 (supra 
note 10) the possibility was real that the agenda item woGld be allocated to the Legal 
(Sixth) Committee and that it might then find its way into the International Law Com-
mission . This possibility arose primarily because the original title of the item described 
its subject as "Declaration and treaty ... " and therefore the formulation of rules and the 
drafting of legal documents seemed indicated. However, after some informal consulta-
tions among various governments, Malta agreed to erase the terms "Declaration and 
treaty .. . " and have them replaced by "Examination of the question . .. "The change 
and the resulting allocation of the item to the Political Committee were approved 
simultaneously by the General Assembly on October 6, 1967. Report of the First Com-
mittee, U.N. Doc. N6964 (December 12, 1967), in General Assembly, Official Records, 
22nd Session (Annexes: Item 92). Cheever infers from the United Nations debates that a 
great majority of governments did not want the item in the Legal Committee and in 
the International Law Commission because they were not ready to commit themselves 
to a new treaty regime, and because they considered the sea-bed issue to be an economic 
and political matter of fundamental national interest. See Daniel S. Cheever's com-
ment in panel discussion focused on national attitudes toward international organiza-
tions for the sea, in THE LA w OF THE SEA: INTERNATIONAL RULES AND ORGANIZATION FOR THE 
SEA 398 (L. Alexander ed. 1969) (Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Conference of the Law of 
the Sea Institute, June 1968). 
13. E.g., see statement by Mr. Mendelvich in the Political Committee, U.N. Doc. 
AC. l!PV . 1525 at 8-21 (November 10, 1967). The Soviet Union saw the establish-
ment of a special committee and the formulation of basic principles as risky undertak-
ings, labelled the question as "premature" and warned against "over-hasty action ." 
14. The United States statements took on a considerable and elaborate cloak of 
ambiguity. There were freely used phrases such as those describing the deep ocean floor 
as "the legacy of all human beings" to be used "for the benefit of mankind" in such a way 
as to keep it open to "all States, without discrimination" and without "unfair 
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British, on the other hand, now accepted the inevitable and were quite 
ready to go along with the policy debate as long as it was low-keyed and 
inconclusive. 15 The policies of the three major powers were certainly far 
from identical in 1967. However, a convergence process clearly started, 
and the policy distances originally separating most of the larger powers 
were visibly shortened. The majority of the countries of the industrial 
North would have probably deferred the seabed issue if it were 
politically feasible to do so. 16 But there was no going back. The Ad Hoc 
Seabed Committee was established by a unanimous vote of the General 
Assembly 17 as an inevitable step toward a further political escalation of 
the problem. 
1968-The Stage Is Set 
By the time the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee started its work in 1968, 
the policy concerns shifted considerably in the direction of international 
action. The pitch of the debates may have been a little below its 1967 
level primarily because the main battle had already been fought. What 
had been keenly argued and contested in 1966-67, now was entirely out 
of the way; the seabed issue as a political problem was fully in the lap of 
the world organization. The major powers of the advanced world 
yielded some ground to the mounting pressures from smaller and 
developing states. When the question arose as to the Ad Hoc 
Committee's mandate for the future, no opposition was voiced against 
its continuation. Consequently, the Ad Hoc qualification was removed 
and membership was increased from thirty-five to forty-two. 18 
The policy conflict now revolved about the question of how the United 
Nations should proceed. Many advanced countries, the major powers 
among them, were quite content to let the seabed debate linger on in a 
very low key. The developing countries favored the institution-building. 
Thirty-nine of them 19 sponsored a draft resolution requesting the 
competition"; however, the controlling policy was much better represented by the 
emphasis laid on the need to move ahead with "all deliberate speed" and on "progressive 
development of general standards and principles." See especially statements by Messrs. 
Goldberg, Abel and Popper in the following documents: U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1524 at 18 
(November 8, 1967); U.N. Doc. A/C 1 1530 at 18 (November 16, 1967); U.N. Doc. A/C 
1/PV 1542at18-22 (December 7, 1967); U.N. A/ AC.135/SR.3 at 13 (March 20, 1968). 
15. The British consistently advocated "a slow and careful approach;; without 
committing themselves to any definite position. E.g., see British statements as recorded 
in U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1524 at 8-16 <November 8, 1967), U.N. Doc. A/C. 1/PV. 1542 at 
16-17 <December 7, 1967). 
16. Full analysis of this trend is in SLOUKA, supra note 10, chapter 2. 
17. G.A. Res. 2340 (XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16at14-15, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967). 
18. G.A. Res. 2467 C(XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR Supp.18 at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968). 
19. The sponsors were African, Asian and Latin American countries, with Yul!oslavia 
joining them later as the only European country. For the full list of sponsors see 
U.N. Doc. A/7477 at 6 (December 20, 1968). 
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Secretary-General to study "the question of establishing in due time 
appropriate international machinery for the promotion of the 
exploration and exploitation of the resources" of the deep ocean floor 
while "taking into consideration the interest and needs of the 
developing countries .... " 20 The draft resolution encountered serious 
difficulties in the Political Committee. There were seventy-seven 
affirmative votes, nine against, and eighteen abstentions. 21 The General 
Assembly did not change this voting pattern.22 For the first time in the 
seabed policy-making process, the United States did not vote 
affirmatively for a resolution and instead led, with a few other 
developed countries, the block of abstentions. Also making history were 
the negative votes, all of them coming from the Soviet Union and its 
allies. The stage was set for 1969. 
1969-The Year of Action 
In 1969, the main policy concern focused on normative action, on the 
actual formulation of controlling principles and law-making 
mechanisms. The hot issue of 1968 cooled down perceptibly. A draft 
resolution requesting the Secretary-General to "prepare a further stud~; 
on various types of international machinery ... having jurisdiction over 
the peaceful uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor ... ", a request 
which had caused a rift in 1968, now went through smoothly with a 100-
0-9 division of the vote. 23 The pressing demands that the international 
community move toward the articulation and acceptance of norms 
effectively and immediately regulating state conduct were embodied in 
two draft resolutions. One requested the Secretary-General "to 
ascertain the views of Member States on the desirability of convening at 
an early date a conference on the law of the sea .... " 24 The split of the 
General Assembly vote on this text was rather wide: 65-12-30. Although 
no roll call was taken, the general lines of the polarization which 
20. The text of the resolution can also be found in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 204-215, 
(1969). 
21. For a full survey of the formulation and voting on this and the other three 
sea-bed resolutions of 1968 see U.N. Doc. An477 (December 20, 1968). The bloc of 77 na-
tions voting in favor of the draft resolution on the feasibility of international control 
machinery for the deep ocean floor consisted of developing countries johed by 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. 
22. See Table, supra p. 65. 
23. G.A. Res. 2574 C(XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30 at 11, U.N. Doc. An630 (1969). 
There was no roll-call, but the 11 abstentions included those who in 1969 cast negative 
votes on the same proposal', while the 1968 abstentions changed into affirmative votes. 
The text of this and all other 1969 General Assembly sea-bed resolutions are reprinted 
together with the voting records, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, 419-423 (1970). 
24. G.A. Res. 2574 A (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30at10, U.N. Doc. An630 (1969). 
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emerged in 1968 were again quite visible. This polarization emerged in 
full light during the climax of the 1969 policy-making process when a 
draft resolution was presented demanding that until an international 
regime of the deep ocean floor were established, all exploitation of such 
areas should be halted and no claims to any part of the deep ocean floor 
or its resources were to be recognized. 25 The recorded vote of sixty-two 
in favor, twenty-eight against and twenty-eight abstaining, with eight 
absentees, was almost a classic split. The bloc of sixty-two read like a 
roster of the less developed and non-aligned countries of Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, and Finland, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The twenty-eight 
against represented the developed North, including the United States 
and the Soviet Union with their respective allies and South Africa. Onl:v 
Ghana and Malta disturbed the homogeneity of this group. The 
abstaining bloc and the absentees reflected various special interests or, 
perhaps, disinterest. 26 The resolution, of course, had little chance to 
have any effect on the actual exploitation of deep ocean floor resources. 
Little such exploitation was then, and is now, really taking place 
anywhere. Besides, with the boundaries between seabed areas under 
national jurisdiction and the deep ocean floor undefined, the resolution, 
instead of inducing the developed countries to move more willingly and 
swiftly toward some international regime embodying the principle of 
sharing the ocean floor riches with others, could just as well have 
prodded them to claim progressively larger segments of the ocean floor 
as falling under their own coastal jurisdiction. 
That an important phase of the seabed policy-making process 
culminated in 1969 was quite apparent in 1970. The high 1969 polic~· 
polarization along the North-South axis was followed by the splintering 
of each of the two blocs into smaller mixed segments. Again four major 
seabed draft resolutions were before the General Assembly, but there 
was little real fighting over them.27 Onb· one of the resolutions calling 
for a comprehensive law of the sea conference to be convened in 1973 or 
later drew seven rather routinely negative votes from Eastern Europe 
and six assorted abstentions. 28 
25. G.A. Res. 2574 D (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30at11, U.N. Doc. Al7630 (1969). 
26. This group was a real mix. It included Cuba, Rumania, Israel, United Arab Re-
public, Indonesia and Libya, among others. Possibly many of these countries abstained 
because of some concern about the existing or planned oil and gas exploitation off their 
coasts. 
27. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) was a declaration of principles whose substance included 
much that would have been rejected as preposterous only two years earlier. Now it went 
100-0-14. G.A. Res. 2750 A (XXV) and 2750 B (XXV) calling for economic and political 
studies of some aspects of the sea-bed problem passed by 104-0-16 and 111-0-11 respec-
tively. All 1970 General Assembly sea-bed resolutions are reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERALS 220-30 (1971). 
28. G.A. Res. 2750 C (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 25, U.N. Doc. M028 (1970). 
The vote was recorded. 
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The relative quiet after the 1969 storm was not a sign of an expanding 
consensus. It simply signalled that the seabed issue was thoroughly 
politicized, the lines of contention were drawn, and with the subtleties 
afforded by the United Nations diplomatic game largely exhausted, the 
policy-maki_ng process started to shift into channels beyond the world 
organization. But what factors made the seabed issue go through its 
initial phase in the United-Nations the way it did? Was there anything 
beyond the usual push and pull of diverse national interests that may 
have given the policy-making process the acceleration and scope it 
achieved between 1966 and 1970? 
DATA, EXPERTISE, AND INTERNATIONAL OCEAN POLICY 
All political issues before the General Assembly fall within the 
broader context of East-West rivalries, North-South tensions, or the 
various subsets of regional strife of the Middle East, Indo-Pakistan or 
Sino-Soviet variety. These confrontations and relationships often 
determine the size and intensity of a policy consensus on an 
international issue more profoundly than the content of the issue itself 
would suggest. 
Many policy questions laid before the United Nations also have 
another, very different dimension: they are open to various, essentially 
non-political pressures. One particularly rich and general source of such 
influences is the considerable scientific and technological component 
penetrating so many concerns of modern society. This study 
concentrates on the impact of science and technology on the seabed 
policy-making in the United Nations not only because this component 
has been so very conspicuous in ocean affairs, but also because it ma~· 
possibly have a more general significance for other international law-
making efforts. One point to keep in mind is that the scientific and 
technological component of international policy-making, however 
penetrating, is only one of the major influences on the international 
behavior of states. After assessing its impact, it would be imperative, 
for the sake of greater balance, to identify and evaluate the particular 
thrust of other elements, a task beyond the scope of this paper. 
The basic hypotheses to be explored are rather simple. The evolution 
of the United Nations seabed policy-making process suggests that the 
scientific and technological component had some effects on the 
mobilization of interests in the seabed issue (the type of active 
participants in the political interplay), on the scope of the policy 
problem in terms of other ocean-related questions included in or 
appended to the seabed issue, and on the limits of time within which the 
seabed issue could and should be settled. These three major effects, 
partly overlapping and each with a number of subtleties and 
ramifications, are now to be examined. 
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Technical Information: A Radix of Ocean Politics 
Marine science and technology, as a set of data and capabilities, had a 
profound effect on the mobilization of political interests in the United 
Nations. At first it provided the Trojan horse in which the seabed issue 
invaded the world organization as a political rather than a technical 
problem. It then alerted and energized into action governments to 
whom the seabed had been an entity even more remote and politically 
inert than the moon and outer space. It also provided new opportunity 
for political influence to those who have ordinarily had little such 
opportunity. Scientists, engineers, various functional organizations and 
interest groups, and administrators not ordinarily involved in scientific 
and technological affairs found a new access route to policy-making. 
The brief survey of the events of 1966 29 already indicated how 
requests for scientific and technical reports on the resources of the deep 
ocean floor and other related issues served as powerful catalysts of the 
international policy-making process and carried the signals from the 
Economic and Social Council and from the Economic and Financial 
Committee of the General Assembly into its Political Committee. The 
use in 1966 of technical information to mobilize political participation 
contrasted sharply with 1958. 
The proposals made in the fifties for an internationalization of the 
deep ocean floor 30 had two common denominators. Not only were they 
formulated in primarily legal terms, but their proponents completely 
failed to show any political and economic potential through such 
scientific and technical data and economic projections as were then 
available. They stirred little interest. Consequently, the issue was 
undersold and lost. 
Yet all the technical information employed so effectively in the sixties 
had been available in the fifties as well. The reports requested in 1966 of 
the Secretary-General 31 and the data Ambassador Pardo carefully 
plucked in 1967 from the available knowledge about the properties of 
the seabed and the related technologies to fire the imagination of policy-
makers 32 contained nothing new. The presence throughout the three 
29. See pp. 65-68. 
30. See p. 66 and especially note 1. 
31. The reports, referred to at p. 66, were eventually issued as U.N. Secretary-
General, Resources of the Sea [(Part I: Mineral Resources of the Sea Beyond the 
Continental Shelf), U.N . Doc. E/4449/ Add. 1(February19, 1968); (Part II: Food Resources 
of the Sea Beyond the Continental Shelf Excluding Fish, U.N. Doc. E/4449/ Add. 2 
(February 7, 1968)]; and U.N. Secretary-General, Marine Science and Technology: Survey 
and Proposals, U.N. Doc. E/4487 (April 24, 1968). 
32. Ambassador Pardo quoted miscellaneous data illustrating tI:ie urgency of the sea-
bed issue and the imminence of the exploitation of sea-bed resources by those techni-
cally capable to do so; among his sources were The New York Times, Komsomol,skaya 
Pravda, Oil and Gas Journal, and Forbes. But his main source was a volume by an 
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major ocean areas of metal-rich manganese nodules lying freely and in 
huge quantities on the deep ocean floor was known since the voyage of 
the Challenger in 1872-76.33 The technological accessibility and the 
economic potential of that latent resource have occupied considerable 
attention since the end of World War 11.34 
This does not mean that in the sixties the scientific and technical 
information was the only effective factor in the mobilization of political 
interests. There was, at the same time, a confluence of various 
interacting conditions which helped escalate the seabed issue into a 
major policy problem. Among the elements which set the stage was an 
increasing frustration of the developing c,:mntries over their prospects 
of rapid growth, the decreased tensions of the East-West conflict and 
the relative unwillingness and inability of the superpowers to resist 
effectively the smaller states' policies which did not involve the vital 
interests of the superpowers. However, the projection of technical data 
was clearly the direct stimulus of political interaction just as the 
demands for scientific and technical reports served as the instrument to 
get the issue into the United Nations. The Secretariat itself moved 
energetically to intensify the awareness of governments and other 
organizations in the potential of the seabed issue. The Secretary-
General, empowered by the General Assembly to prepare a special 
survey of marine science and technology with the help of an ad hoc 
group of experts, created a prestigious council. Originally envisaged as 
consisting of no more than eight men,35 the group of experts eventually 
had thirty-two participants and six observers. The size of the group, the 
American oceanographer and mining engineer, J. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE 
SEA (1965). From this Ambassador Pardo freely used data showing the range and 
quantities of valuable sea-bed resources: aluminum enough for 20,000 years at the 1960 
world rate of consumption, manganese for 400,000 years, zirconium for 100,000 years, 
copper for 6,000 years, nickel for 150,000 years, cobalt for 200,000 years, molybdenum for 
30,000 years, and all this in the Pacific Ocean alone. For references to the text of the Pardo 
address, see note 11 supra. 
33. The expedition's official report on deep sea deposits was published only in 1891 
as a part of a 50-volume collection. Murray & Renard, Report on Deep Sea Deposits, 5 
REPORT ON THE SCIENTIFIC RESULTS OF THE VOYAGE OF H.M.S. CHALLENGER (C. Wyville 
Thomson ed. 1891 ). 
34. A reference list of some 190 published items in Mero, supra note 32, at 296-
304 indicates the proliferation in the 1940's and 1950's of scientific and technical re-
ports on deep ocean floor deposits and on their exploitability. 
35. G.A. Res. 2172 (XXI), par. 4, called for a small group of experts to be selected 
especially from the specialized agencies and inter-governmental organizations. The 
Secretary-General suggested the actual size of the group in par. 4 of a note on the 
financial implications of the proposal to set up the group. See U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1085 
(November 15, 1966) in U.N. General Assembly, 21st Sess., Official Records, Annexes, 
Item 94. 
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scientific prominence of many of its members, and the number of 
organizations represented 36 were elements likely to mobilize 
considerable interest in the international scientific community as well 
as in the national systems. Those scientists who were aware of the 
political issues acted as advisors and as consultants. 
The second step in the process of mobilizing political interests by the 
employment of the scientific and technological component grew out of 
the first. Supported by his group of experts, the Secretary-General sent 
all the member states a note verbale and a questionnaire 37 requesting 
data describing each nation's activities in marine science and technology 
and the views of each government regarding its need for international 
activities in marine science and technology. The impact of this type of 
inquiry as an interest-mobilizing device is obvious; the responding 
governments 38 had to survey their potential, interest and policy in 
marine science and technology and to reassess their goals. 
All this preceded the submission of the Maltese proposal and, very 
possibly, also stimulated the policy of Malta itself more rapidly than the 
Secretariat had anticipated. In any case, by the summer and autumn of 
1967 the ground work was done and Ambassador Pardo's well-prepared 
presentation only served to intensify and broaden the spectrum of 
aroused interests while, at the same time, shifting the issue more into 
the public domain and thereby multiplying the pressures on the 
formation of national policies. 
The mobilizing efforts, significantly aided by the availability and 
manipulation of technical data and by the need for technical 
information, resulted in an expanded and diversified field of 
participants in the policy-making process. The effects were very obvious 
on the governmental level. During the initial phases of the seabed de-
bate in the General Assembly and in the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee, 
sixty-four countries contributed to the recorded exchange of views 
36. Among the organizations represented were the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the World Health 
Organization, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Hydrographic Bureau, the World 
Meterological Organization and finally, the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research of 
the International Council of Scientific Unions, the only non-governmental organization 
formally represented. Eleven experts participated in their individual capacity; they were 
nationals of the United States (3), France (2), the Soviet Union (2), the United Kingdom 
(2), Japan (1), and Iceland (1). 
37. Full texts of the note verba/,e and the questionnaire are to be found as Annex II 
in U.N. Doc. E/4487 (April, 24, 1968). 
38. Sixty-three governments responded to the note verbal£. For list see Annex III 
in U.N. Doc. E/4481 (April 24, 1968). 
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between November 1967 - July 1968.39 Of these sixty-four, spokesmen 
for thirty states advocated the establishment of an international regime 
for the deep ocean floor. Most of these (twenty-five) were countries 
relatively uninvolved in marine affairs and without appreciable levels 
of national expertise in marine science and engineering.40 On the other 
hand, most-of the nations with such expertise and with well-developed 
and active interests in the uses of the ocean showed almost no 
inclination to move toward an international regime. Thus, the political 
burden of maintaining the seabed question as a live issue in the United 
Nations policy process rested primarily on states who, until then 
relative strangers to marine affairs, were mobilized into action by the 
dissemination of the technical data and by the resulting images of more 
or less readily accessible submarine riches threatened by imminent but 
unequal exploitation by the advanced countries. To some extent, the 
intensity of the newly formed national interest in the economic 
resources of the seabed and in the political potential of the seabed issue 
also manifested itself in the swelling of the membership of the Seabed 
Committee: starting with thirty-five in 1967, it went to forty-two in 
1968 and to eighty-six in 1970. 
On the level of specialized agencies and other international 
organizations, the mobilizing function of the scientific and technological 
component was somewhat different but also clearly distinguishable. 
These organizations were called in, or projected themselves into, the 
policy-making process largely because of the relevance of their 
expertise. 41 However, the technical data and evaluations they offered 
were inevitably and inextricably mixed with their policies.42 
39. An analysis of the national positions on which this count is based is presented 
in Slouka, supra note 10, ch. 2. 
40. The five countries with higher levels of oceanographic expertise were Austria, 
India, Mexico, Netherlands, and Sweden. But of these, only Sweden demanded inter-
national controls as a matter of high urgency. 
41. See note 36 supra for organizations represented through their experts on the 
Secretary-General's group of experts . This, of course, was not an exceptional instance. 
When issues of considerable technical cor.1plexity come up for policy discussion, the 
United Nations more or less routinely seeks all the expertise available. The General 
Assembly resolution to convene in 1973 a comprehensive conference on the Law of the Sea 
specifically invites six major specialized agencies to cooperate with the Seabed Committee 
in the preparation of scientific and technical documentation and explicitly calls on still 
other organizations to join the effort. G.A. Res. 2750 C <XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 
25, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). The General Assembly resolution on the preparation of the 
1972 Conference on the Human Environment invites the cooperation of all the specialized 
agencies and all other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations 
concerned. G.A. Res. 2581, (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30 at 44, U.N. Doc. A/7630 0969). 
42. Consider, for example, the statement made in the First Committee by a spokes-
man for the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the organization 
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Next, the United Nations staff officers in the sections of the 
Secretariat responsible for servicing the seabed issue found themselves 
in positions from which they could manipulate some aspects of the 
international bargaining by injecting their own judgment as to what 
would be a desirable course of the future international policy. They 
projected their views into some of the proceedings directly. 43 In other 
instances, the delegates of some of the less developed countries provided 
them with opportunities for policy influence when, without adequate 
guidance from their capitals 44 and unable to back-up the new policy 
seeking to broaden its responsibilities for the planning and coordination of oceanographic 
research : 
The key problem in Malta's proposal is the exploitation of the enormous reaches 
of the ocean and, particularly, the mineral resources of the ocean floor. Most of 
the legal, political, social, economic and other aspects evoked in this connexion 
are associated with the problem of resources. One cannot, however, envisage any 
solution without realizing that to do so mankind should have at its disposal all 
the knowledge of the ocean accumulated over the years, and much new 
knowledge which may be gathered only thrO\,igh persistent scientific research 
.... A lot must be done in promoting scientific investigations, in improving and 
developing the necessary logistics of such investigations, in establishing a policy 
framework for effective international co-operation, and in providing technical 
assistance to those countries whose scientific and technical development lags 
behind. One could not, after all, have started building electrical power stations 
before inventing electricity. Neither should one start to exploit the ocean floor 
before the solid scientific foundation for this exploitation is established. 
Mr. Varchaver's statement, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1527 at 5-6 (November 14, 1967) 
(emphasis added). 
43. An illustrative case of mixing technical expertise with value judgments made by 
the officers of the Secretariat was the implementation of ECOSOC resolution 1112 (XL) 
which helped stimulate among the developing states an active interest in the deep 
ocean floor issue. That resolution called for a survey of "the present state of know-
ledge" of the sea resources and their exploitability and also asked that "any gaps in 
available knowledge which merit early attention by virtue of their importance to the 
development of ocean resources, and of the practicality of their early exploitation," 
be also identified. In the context of the resolution, and as was later stressed by the 
sponsors (especially the United States), the reference to "gaps in available knowledge" 
meant "scientific and technical knowledge." However, the Secretariat chose to identify 
as gaps "the legal status" of the sea-bed resources and the "ways and means" of 
ensuring that the resources benefit the developing countries-gaps not so much in 
knowledge as in social organization. See U.N. Doc. A/C.1/952 (October 5, 1967). To 
implement this interpretation of its mandate, the Secretariat added a number of 
paragraphs amounting to a clear advocacy of a sea-bed regime placed under a public 
international body and based on the principle of universal sharing in the benefits. 
While the technical substance of the survey was prepared by Dr. Frank Wang, Marine 
Geologist of the U.S. Geological Survey serving as a special consultant to the 
Secretary-General, the closing paragraphs regarding the preferred political solution 
were the work of the Ad Hoc Unit on Marine Science and Technology. The entire 
document, U.N. Doc. E/4449/ Add. 1 (February 19, 1968), was issued as a report by the 
Secretary-General. 
44. Data show clearly the scope of the technical inadequacies contributing to the lack 
of back-stop available to many delegations from their home governments. A world-
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tasks with the technical information needed, they turned to the 
professional United Nations staff for enlightenment.45 Some of the 
professionals in the United Nations thus became middlemen between 
knowledge and policy, and in many cases the medium and the message 
again were-thoroughly mixed. 
Finally, there remains the subtle but possibly penetrating influence 
exercised by individual scientists cast in the roles of international and 
national consultants or functioning as members of their own non-
governmental scientific organizations. For instance, the status of the 
non-governmental Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research as an 
official consultant to the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Com-
mission was strengthened when the seabed issue entered the United 
Nations. In its efforts to expand the role and impact of the Com-
mittee, the organization's energetic leadership was clearly aided by 
the recognized need for scientific and technical information as a guiding 
light for the policy-making efforts.46 
In sum, one of the functions of the scientific and technical component 
was to blend a diversity of goals into one single policy arena. The usual 
clash between those def ending the status quo and others demanding a 
change in the direction of economic justice and even equality became 
an array of intertwined interests and demands. Among the diverse 
priorities pressed by different actors was the strengthening of the 
United Nations through independent financing derived from the 
exploitation of the internationalized seabed. Some organizations sought 
new functions in order to obtain a fresh lease on life or more power. For 
some states, security concerns came first. To still others, preservation 
of the widest possible freedom of oceanic research was the declared 
fundamental value. There was much more: those who saw little of real 
interest in the ocean sought to participate in the policy-making process 
in order to have a lever in international negotiations for values 
unrelated to marine affairs. The making of the seabed policy was 
certainly democratized, but the cost of such democratization may 
often be a diluted, ineffective consensus. 
wide survey made in l!:J64 by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences identified 2,563 
senior professional oceanographers. Over half of the total was concentrated in six 
countries: Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, 
United States. Fifty-nine states had none, and twenty-six states had less than five ocean-
ographers each. See U.N. Doc. El 4487 at 64 (April 24, 1968). 
45. This statement is based on a series of interviews this author conducted at the 
United Nations between 1968 and 1970. Many of the actual cases are not presently 
free to be individually reported. However, for some illustrative instances whose descrip-
tion is more extensive than this article could accommodate, see SLoUKA, supra note 10, 
ch. 3. 
46. The best available source indicating the expanding role of SCOR is its Proceed-
ings, especially vol. 5 - 7, issued by SCOR at La Jolla, California. 
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Scientific Data and the Politics of the Future 
Where scientific and technical information generates an 
international policy-making process, the futuristic dimension of that 
process becomes its dominant characteristic. In this sense, the seabed 
issue has been an exceptional case among other policy problems before 
the United Nations. Almost every policy-making effort is undertaken in 
order to regulate the subsequent conduct of states. But the stimulus 
which brings most policy issues before the United Nations is usually an 
actual or imminent conflict in the real world.47 International systems or 
order are still more effectively produced by actual disorder than b:v 
preventive, anticipatory regulation. In the amorphous political process 
of the international community, the pragmatic still leads over the 
program ma tic. 
In a technological and geopolitical sense, the deep ocean floor was in 
1966-67 and is today far from becoming a field of active contention 
among nations stemming from material utilization of space and 
resources. 48 In fact, some observers argue that actual or imminent 
conflict over the seabed resources will be necessary to generate 
agreement. The time for the crystallization of order "will not come until 
the major posers have made discoveries of minerals in areas which are 
too close to each other for comfort, or until they are able to produce 
minerals in such profusion as to require some system of balancing 
world production against world demand." 49 That the seabed issue is 
47. The Middle East, Kashmir, Congo, West Iran, the arms race and decolonization 
are typical instances in which the United Nations was to play the conflict-resolving func-
tion. However, the case of Antarctica, so often referred to as analogous to the problem 
of the sea-bed and a model for its resolution, was also spurred much more by an actual 
conflict between countries than by their foresight. The "temporary" internationalization 
of Antarctica through the 1959 Treaty was a response to a prolonged and progres-
sively worsening conflict between the United Kingdom and the Latin American 
countries claiming portions of Antarctica. The Treaty successfully doused the smolder-
ing clashes between states driven against one another by their notions of national 
prestige in a competition for frozen acreage nobody really knew what to do with except 
to explore and show off on political maps as national property. The call for free scientific 
-exploration of an Antarctica without any military weapons provided a face-saving 
way out to states fighting for a vast emptiness, and it also gave a chance to others, such 
as the Soviet Union, to suppress the urge to join the contest. A particularly good 
study of the politics of Antarctica and its analogy to other issues is P. JESSUP & H. 
TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY (1959). 
48. Of course, in specific areas of the marginal seas, such as the North Sea, 
material interaction of states in the exploitation of the space and resources of the 
sea-bed has already brought about political settlements and legal arrangements. 
49. Northcutt Ely, "The Administration of Mineral Resources Underlying the 
High Seas," paper presented to the National Institute on Marine Resources of the 
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more a conflict in the minds of men than in the sea and that it rests on 
national interpretations of various types of scientific and technical data 
rather than on physical interactions of states, was recognized in the 
early stages of the United Nations debate. Mr. Akwei of Ghana stated 
the case most eloquently: 
In the past, the United Nations has been what I may call 
conservative in the sense that it has mainly concerned itself 
with the past and the present: where we could have looked 
ahead and taken firm steps to deal with matters still in their 
embryonic stages, we have been wont to shirk such action .... 
We all know too well how dearly that attitude has cost us. 
Having delayed too long, we have often been confronted with 
far more complicated situations which we have then 
frantically tried to solve but, alas, too late. Thanks to the 
Maltese initiative, we have a unique opportunity to get out of 
the rut, to look ahead and to take decisive action now to 
prevent future difficulties.50 
We do not yet know and probably will not know for some time 
whether and under what conditions scientific and technical data will 
have a sufficient thrust to sustain a policy issue in its intended course 
until it reaches consensus. However, it is obvious that technical 
information does compel governments to bargain and at least initially 
have enough force to politicize issues. The geopolitical concepts 
emphasizing physical accessibility as the primary impulse for the 
American Bar Association, June 1967, Long Beach, California. Compare the following 
view: 
I cannot agree with those who say that international law will not and should not 
be developed until a conflict situation has arisen, that is, until mining has 
actually begun. It is inconceivable to me that we cannot design institutions that 
will serve to guide development rather than to follow it. 
Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules: From Scientific Phenomenon to World Re.-;ource, 
THE LAw OF THE SEA-: THE FUTURE OF THE SEA'S .t{ESOURCES 32 (L. Alexander ed. 
1968) (Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, June 
1967). 
50. U.N. Doc. A/C.1/ PV. 1526 at 36 (November 13, 1967). Mr. Akwei 's optimism does 
not necessarily reflect the optimism of inexperience with which some of the newly 
independent countries entered the process of international policy-making. Sir Leslie 
Glass, with the centuries of British pragmatism in foreign involvements behind him, 
made very similar comments: 
Here in the United Nations we spend so much time trying to solve old problems-
problems born of the past errors and wickedness of mankind-that it is 
immensely stimulating and encouraging to be asked to look forward - forward to 
the new world made possible for mankind by technological advance. I think we 
should all be deeply indebted to the representative of Malta for jolting us out of 
our preoccupation with the present and the past and forcing us to raise our eyes 
and look at the wider horizons of the future. 
TT.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1524 at 8 (November 8, 1967). 
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politicization of space need to be refined. Jean Gottmann, a political 
geographer, stated some time ago, "Our political world is a limited one: 
it extends only over the space accessible to men. Accessibility is the 
determining factor: areas to which men have no access do not have any 
political standing or problems." 51 This statement is acceptable only if 
the term "access" is broadened enough to include cognition. The focus 
must be shifted from physical accessibility to the phenomenological 
level of perceived opportunities and imagined values.52 The futuristic, 
anticipatory character of international policy-making stimulated by 
scientific and technological data has at least two important 
consequences, one for the structure of the policy-making process, and 
another, much more fundamental, for the very nature of the 
international system of order and the prospects of its development. 
Under the first category, the seabed issue strongly suggests that a 
pronounced futuristic dimension of a policy issue still further 
multiplies and diversifies the field of participants. This effect is 
actually but a variation of the mobilizing role of scientific and technical 
information in international politics. The governments active in policy-
making, whose interests are aroused by the dissemination of data, 
determine their policies according to different timetables; some engage 
in long-range planning while others are more concerned about their 
immediate needs. Each, however, must have made some kind of 
judgment before it formulated its own seabed policy about the alter-
native futures toward which the international community was head-
ing. A government proceeding on the assumption that international 
military conflict will remain a major mode of resolving disputes 
is likely to shape its policy priorities very differently from one which 
sees international organization as a growing and in the foreseeable 
future, an effective or even dominant method of maintaining 
international order. Where one state anticipated that the seabed 
policy now being negotiated will be implemented and will yield prac-
51. Gottman, The Political Partitioning of Our World: An Attempt at Analysis, 4 
WoRLD POLITICS 512 (1952). Gottmann applied the same notion of physical accessibil-
ity to the outer space: 
When the first explorers land on the moon, the earth's satellite will pass from the 
field of astronomy to the geography textbooks and lunar political problems will 
appear and grow steadily . 
52. For good studies and discussions of the role of perceptions and images in deci-
sionmaking see, e. h., Boulding, National Images and International Systems, 3 J. OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 121 (1959); Boulding, The Learning and Reality-Testing 
Process in the International System, 21 J. OF !NT'L AFFAIRS 16-39 (1967); K. 
BOULDING, THE IMAGE: KNOWLEDGE IN LIFE AND SOCIETY (1956). See also Holsti, Cognitive 
Dynamics and Images of the Enemy, 21 J. OF !NT'L AFFAIRS 16-39 (1965). 
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tical results only in the early or late eighties, another may have 
been motivated only by its perceptions of the early seventies.53 This 
diversity exists, of course, in every multilateral bargaining. But it is 
much more pronounced where policies now being determined are to 
control the behavior of states in a future not only relatively distant but 
also politically and technologically so very difficult to predict.54 With 
each nation its own forecaster, the multilateral policy-making process 
no longer simply has one hundred thirty known potential participants. 
Depending how they project their national interests and needs into 
different images of the future, they also fall into different time-zones 
differently programmed. The diversity may border on total cacophony. 
The second hypothesis derived from the seabed issue is the 
underlying and far-reaching possibility that, indeed, we may see here 
the beginning of a trend toward international policy-making being more 
and more often stimulated by scientific and technical information than 
by conflicts among states. The question of the seabed was not brought 
into the United Nations in an attempt to cool down and resolve a highh' 
contentious issue threatening to boil over into a crisis. On the contrary, 
a fresh contest among nations was started in the diplomatic forum 
itself by combining scientific and technological information with the 
effective U.N. mechanisms for the dissemination and manipulation of 
such data for policy purposes. This whole question goes far beyond the 
scope of the present study surveying the seabed politics of the General 
Assembly in order to reach some limited judgments about the prospects 
of the current efforts toward a redefinition of the order of the sea. But 
even if it cannot be examined, it must at least be posed: Can scientific 
and technical knowledge, internationally disseminated among the 
policy-makers of individual nations and properly interpreted as to its 
social significance, replace actual state involvement, interaction and 
conflict as a catalyst of order? 
The Sea and the Scientific Imperative 
As a catalyst of political interests in the deep ocean floor, the 
scientific and technological component affected the structure of the 
policy-making process by bringing into it a wide range of participants 
53. In 1969, for instance, the U.S. Under Secretary of State, Alexis Johnson, predicted 
that there will be no international agreement on the deep ocean floor before 1980. Mr. 
Johnson made this statement on May 23, 1969 in the U.S. Marine Resources Council. 11 
OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS, June 27, 1969, at 3. 
54. On the effects of the low predictability of technological change on international law-
making see Wohlstetter, Technowgy, Prediction, and Disorder, THE DISPERSION OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS (R. N. Rosencrance ed. 1964). Problems involved in the forecasting of political 
change are discussed in Friedlander, Forecasting in International Relations, 2 FuTURIBLEs; 
STUDIES IN CONJECTURE 1-111 rn. de Juvenel ed. 1965). 
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with diverse goals. It has also helped to expand the substance of the 
policy-making effort. For example, the attempts in the United Nations 
to arrive at an international seabed policy may be seen as a process of 
technology assessment and control. The economic, political and social 
consequences of science and technology relating to the deep ocean floor 
are considered in terms of the policy-makers' specific values and goals, 
and appropriate management schemes are then proposed. But this 
requires that the policy-makers be continuously in touch with scientific 
and technical data and with experts capable of interpreting them. As a 
result, not only the data but also scientific and technological modes of 
thought and action are injected into the political process, especially 
where they fit the purposes of the decision-makers. 
As the seabed issue evolved in the United Nations, this symbiosis of 
science and politics manifested itself in two major ways. The political 
task of designing an acceptable regime for the deep ocean floor was 
expanded in line with the scientific grasp of the inter-relatedness of 
oceanic phenomena. Many participants had the inclination to seek 
further scientific and technical data as effective tools in bringing about 
an international consensus on a seabed policy. 
Modern marine science has global, comprehensive dimensions. To 
advance oceanographic knowledge, marine scientists must study the 
various natural phenomena within the context of the world ocean seen 
as a larger unity.55 This mode of systemic thinking, so well exemplified 
in modern ecological perspectives,56 is then carried over into the world 
of policy making. The primary responsibility for this transfer of 
scientific concepts into political affairs does not rest with the scientists 
themselves. Much more often it is the policy-makers and the students of 
politics who attempt to build the policy design along the lines of the 
scientific perspective. The argument often sounds beautifully simple 
and eminently sound: "After all, the world ocean is a system, a bio-
55. Professor Wooster of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and President of 
SCOR stated the scientific requirement for studying the ocean as a whole: 
The processes operating in the waters are of large scale and are driven by forces 
of planetary dimensions. Life in the ocean is affected by these processes , so that 
the type, number and distribution of organisms may be controlled by events 
occurring in distant places. Because of this immense unity, investigation of the 
world ocean is inherently an international affair, requiring cooperation ranging 
from the simplest exchange of information to the most complex integration of 
research programs. 
Wooster, The Uce.an and Man, 221 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 1969, at 218. 
56. The various U.N. documents and other materials related to the preparations for 
the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm provide plentiful 
evidence of the tendency to use ecological concepts as indicators of the scope and 
characteristics of the required institution through which to manage the uses of the 
environment. 
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system. Its continued equilibrium, therefore, requires a matching 
administrative system to regulate its use." 57 
However, it is not so clear that what is necessary in science is possible 
in politics. That the world ocean is a unity is an ascertained fact as 
uncompromising as other sets of scientific data. But policies are 
essentially sets of compromises. It would undoubtedly be ideal if social 
response could always match the underlying scientific and technological 
facts.58 For instance, considering the unity and wholeness of the 
biosphere, the use of its resources could be rationalized on a world-wide 
scale.59 However, for a task of such proportions the social instruments 
are not available; the law-making and institution-building capability of 
the international society is still rather underdeveloped in relation to the 
tasks facing it. 
During the opening years of the seabed debate in the United Nations, 
this scientific imperative of comprehending the unity of the ocean was 
an underlying, pervasive influence on the scope of the policy-making 
process. It was generally accepted that whatever system of order is 
eventually created for the deep ocean floor, it must be of global 
dimensions. While references to regional systems were occasionally 
57. Cheever, International Organizations for Marine Science: An Eclectic Model, 
THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 378 (L. Alexander 
ed. 1970) (Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, 
June 1969). 
58. Two prominent scientists in their roles of international administrators force-
fully argued that international regimes for the control of tuna fishing should be tailored 
to the nature and size of the resource, a highly migratory fish crossing oceans and 
even travellin£! among oceans. Their call for a world tuna convention or a world tuna 
commission had logic on its side, but not the politics of tuna: tuna-fishing countries 
capable of a modicum of cooperation in the Pacific follow such diametrically opposed 
practices in the Atlantic that an effort to bring them all under one regime may easily 
wreck even the Pacific arrangements. The two scientists referred to are John L. Kask, the 
former Director of Investigations of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and 
his successor in that position, James Joseph. For their proposals see Kask, Tuna-A 
World Resource, Occasional Paper, no. 2 (Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode 
Island, May 1969); and James Joseph, International Arrangements for the Management 
of Tuna (mimeographed paper, 1971). 
59. Such recommendation by a group of scientists is contained in UNESCO, Final 
Report of the Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for 
Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere, Paris, 4-13 September 
1968, U.N. Doc. SC/MD/9 at 3-4 (January 6, 1969). Still another statement in the same 
report illustrates the tendency to make social action correspond to a given state of 
scientific facts: "There being a wholeness in nature, as shown by ecosystems, there must 
be consideration of the entire systems of nature because limited single-purpose actions 
are no longer tolerable." Id. at 6. 
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made,60 particular solutions were looked upon mainly as deviations 
from general rules and the possibility that they may have a dominant 
role was never seriously advanced. At the same time, the inclination to 
think in terms of large-scale systems contributed to the drift of the 
policy focus from the deep ocean floor to the entire ocean. When the 
General Assembly decided to call for the convening of a comprehensive 
conference on the law of the sea it did so "conscious that the problems of 
ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a 
whole." 61 There is no doubt that many of the states who demanded a 
comprehensive review of the law of the sea were motivated primarily by 
their economic and political interests rather than by a desire to follow 
the scientific perspective. However, the scientific and technological 
component clearly fortified such demands. 
The second major effect of the scientific mode of thinking on the 
policy-making process was the continuous demand for more technical 
data as tools which would somehow speed up or smooth out the 
formation of consensus. The various interests involved in the seabed 
debate were originally mobilized into acting by scientific and technical 
data. Scientific and technical information was obviously essential for 
the definition of a sound international regime governing the uses of the 
deep ocean floor. However, it was just as obvious that the input of the 
technical data into the policy-making had to be closely controlled and 
limited. After all, every policy is of necessity made in conditions of 
relative ignorance; to seek more data means to delay decisions. 
In the seabed debates, the underlying assumption of the data's utility 
for the policy-making was again inadequately questioned and was not 
at all systematically examined. And again, some countries utilized this 
assumption as a support for their own particular goals. 
The need for further scientific and technical data had some 
respectable proponents in the spokesmen for the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO 62 and elsewhere in the 
international scientific community.63 Among states engaged in the 
policy discussions in the General Assembly and its Seabed Committee, 
60. The entire debate in the General Assembly following the Maltese presentation of 
the sea-bed issue in 1967, and its continuation in the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee in 
1968, represents the evidence that a global response to the problem was an unques-
tioned proposition. The Italian policy statements were the only significant, articulate 
exception in their stress on the advisability of approaching the issue through particular 
and regional regimes. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/SR. 7, at 50, (March 26, 1968); U.N. Doc. 
Al AC. 135/1/ Add.9 at 3 (July 16, 1968). The Italian statements elicited no public echo 
in the General Assembly. 
61. G.A. Res. 2750 C (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 25, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
62. See, e.g. , statement of Mr. Varchaver, supra note 43. 
63. An illustrative expression of faith in the policy-healing attributes of scientific 
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the division between those calling for further accumulation of scientific 
and technical data as a prerequisite to political deliberations, and others 
ready to move ahead, was rather interesting. The countries with well-
developed marine science and technology wanted additional facts first 
and policy actions later. States with little relevant expertise were ready 
to move ahead.64 
The division was very obviously a political one between vested 
interests and demands for a change in the distribution of values among 
members of the international community. However, the need for more 
data was an effective instrument designed to slow down the policy-
making process. The Soviet Union went further than any other country 
in claiming that years of scientific and technical work were necessary 
before enough would be known for the policy-making process to 
resume.65 The United States similarly first responded to Ambassador 
Pardo's proposal by suggesting that the setting up of a permanent U .N. 
knowledge may be found in the report of the January 1969 meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research: 
Much of the recent international controversy over the potential resources of the 
deep ocean floor appeared to be qased on inadequate information. Scientific 
investigations relating to the deep ocean floor and its potential resources are 
being conducted by a number of laboratories in various parts of the world . It 
would appear feasible to publish annually a volume of collected reprints of 
papers resulting from such investigations. The widespread distribution of such 
volumes might introduce a more realistic note into future international 
discussions of the deep ocean floor. The Executive Committee recommended that 
UNESCO consider the desirability and feasibility of implementing this proposal. 
SCOR, 5 Proceedings 6-7 no. 1 (April 15, 1969). 
64. Based on a complete analysis of the policy statements of all counties participating 
in the U.N. sea-bed debate in 1967-68. Reported fully in SLOUKA, supra note 10, chs. 2 
and 3. 
65. The initial statement was made by Mr. Mendelevich in the First Committee, as 
reported in U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1525at17-18<November10, 1967). The position was more 
fully elaborated later by Mr. Malik who stated that on the basis of documents available 
Soviet experts had reached certain preliminary conclusions: 
The first was that, despite the work carried on by many Governments and 
international organizations, scientific knowledge of the sea-bed and its mineral 
resources was still extremely limited. The second conclusion had to do with the 
technical and economic possibilities of exploiting marine mineral resources. The 
present state of technology was not such as to allow the large-scale, viable 
exploitation of resources at great depths. So far only small-scale exploitation on 
the continental shelf was feasible . ... The third conclusion reached by USSR 
experts was that inter-governmental co-operation in the study of the sea-bed and 
its resources should be strengthened. His delegation therefore proposed that, in 
its report to the General Assembly, the Ad Hoc Committee should place 
particular stress on the importance of expanding such co-operation between 
States and between the specialized agencies of the United Nations and the other 
inter-governmental bodies concerned. 
U.N. Doc. Al AC. 135/SR.11at8 (June 20, 1968). 
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committee on the oceans would represent "an effective action to 
enhance our knowledge of the ocean and its floor .... " 66 France even 
asked that the whole seabed issue be entrusted to an intergovernmental 
committee of experts.67 The only country which, early in the debate, 
fully and openly expressed the fear that long inquiries into various 
aspects of marine science and technology may unduly delay the policy-
making effort was Sweden.68 Then, in 1969, the Belgian delegate in his 
function of the Chairman of the Economic and TechnicalSubcommittee 
of the Seabed Committee spelled out the problem of what should come 
first, data or policy action: 
The Ad Hoc Committee's report .. . reveals on practically 
every page our ignorance of the marine environment and of the 
processes explaining the natural phenomena which 
characterize it, and of the natural resources buried in the 
bedrock of the oceans. The need to fill the substantial gaps in 
our present knowledge by scientific research and exploration 
has been constantly emphasized .... Does this mean that the 
Committee is now entitled to wait for the result of this research 
before starting to carry out its mandate? Do not think that this 
is just a rhetorical question: on many occasions we have heard 
the argument that any committment as regards a regime for 
the exploitation of undersea resources would be premature so 
long as their value and the techniques for exploiting them are 
not better known. This is why I consider it necessary to refute 
this argument. 69 
Little more was said about this problem in the Seabed Committee or 
when the issue of the ocean floor came up for discussion in the First 
Committee. The remarkable thing was that nobody requested the 
Secretary-General to order and submit a study on the problem of 
managing the data base for a multilateral policy-making process. 
66. Statement by Mr. Goldberg, U.N. Doc. A/C.llPV. 1524 at 22 (November 8, 1967). 
67. Statement by Mr. Palewski, U.N. Doc. Al AC.llPV. 1526 at 18-21 (November 13, 
1967). 
68. Statements by Mrs. Myrdal, U.N. Doc. AIC.1/PV. 1527 at 47 (November 14, 
1967); U.N. Doc. AIC.llPV. 1542 at 22-25 (December 7, 1967). See also official com-
ment sent by the Swedish Government to the U.N. Secretary-General in U.N. Doc. Al AC. 
13511 at 20-21 (February 25, 1968). 
69. Statement by Mr. Denorme, U.N. Doc. Al AC. 138ISC.2/3 at 1-2 (March 12, 1969). 
Mr. Denorme also commented that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was signed without too 
much knowledge about the outer space, and that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf was signed, and the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the same subject 
was made, when we did not know more about the continental shelf than we know 
today about the continental slope, continental rise and the abyssal plain. Id. at 2-3. 
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THE OCEAN POLITICS FOR THE SEVENTIES 
There are no indications that the ocean politics in the seventies will 
materially differ from the experiences of the 1966-69 seabed overture. 
The scientific and technological component of the policy-making process 
is likely to affect that process in about the same way. It will tend to keep 
the field of active participants very large, perhaps universal, and the 
involvement of many other interests very diverse. Nor is there much 
chance that the seabed issue will be effectively isolated from other 
thorny problems of the law of the sea, given the diversity of 
participants, the perceived unity of the world ocean, and the nature of 
modern marine technology. Nor is it likely that a way will be found how 
to determine the needed levels of scientific and technological data to be 
brought into the policy-making process. 
All this points in the direction of a very protracted bargaining effort. 
If the 1973 Conference on the Law of the Sea really takes place that 
year, it is unlikely to be very productive. However, if it does produce 
new draft conventions, they are bound to be very vague and to require 
excessive time before receiving the necessary minimum number of rati-
fications. The time between the coming into force of the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf and the moment the need for an international 
policy governing the shelf had been recognized was about nineteen 
years; the time-spans taken by the negotiation and coming into fo~·ce of 
the other law of the sea treaties signed in Geneva in 1958 were similar. 
No persuasive evidence suggests that in the seventies the international 
community will legislate faster. There is evidence that as scientific 
progress and technological change continuously accelerate, their lead 
over global policy responses widens. 
If this general assessment of the situation is at least partially correct 
another prediction follows almost automatically. Where global policy-
making processes are perceptibly slower than scientific and 
technological change which requires regulation-and the seabed issue 
falls fully into this category-a strong trend toward the proliferation of 
international policy subsystems sets in. In their need for some certaint~· 
and stability, the states will simply try to regulate their behavior in 
various geographical and functional areas by different means as the 
needs arise. To put it bluntly, the continuation of the United Nations 
seabed politics into the seventies is not likely to lead to a unification of 
international oceanic order but to its diffusion, ·and to the emergence of 
many functional, regional, local, bilateral, and even unilateral 
responses to the need for orderly policy change. 
In no sense does this mean that the global policy-making process 
seeking to redefine the oceanic system of order is an exercise in futility 
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or even an undesirable development. The very opposite is true. if, as the 
trend indicates, the various members of the international community 
will find it necessary to set policies and make agreements as they run 
into problems in their ocean uses, the global debate continuously 
searching out and defining areas of consensus and formulating basic 
general principles of conduct will be more necessary than ever. The 
international community can hardly hope to have, in any foreseeable 
future, what individual states are still striving for with such great 
difficulty, a system of technology assessment which would guide the 
national societies in the choice of their policies and actions. The global 
policy debates in the United Nations are probably the closest thing to a 
process of technology assessment one can expect to have on the 
international level. An incessant flow of interrtational confrontations, 
compromises and other interactions interspersed with scientific and 
technical reports and projections, reflect the changes in facts, and in 
policies. We do not have anything in international politics but this 
complex interplay to channel national behavior in areas rich in 
technology into more reasonable and orderly patterns. 
The one great gap that needs to be filled soon is in our understanding 
how to ,create international systems of order from below, how to lead 
toward a global orchestration of the various responses to scientific and 
technological change by states acting unilaterally or in bilateral, 
regional, or other lim'ited and often very temporary contexts. To 
understand this better rs to understand better the reality around us. 
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